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ABSTRACT 
The CubeSat form factor of nano-satellite (a satellite 
with a mass between one and ten kilograms) has grown 
in popularity due to their ease of construction and low 
development and launch costs.  In particular, their use 
as student led payload design projects has increased due 
to the growing number of launch opportunities.  
CubeSats are often deployed as secondary or tertiary 
payloads on most US launch vehicles or they may be 
deployed from the ISS.  The focus of this study will be 
on CubeSats launched from the ISS. 
From a space safety standpoint, the development and 
deployment processes for CubeSats differ significantly 
from that of most satellites.  For large satellites, 
extensive design reviews and documentation are 
completed, including assessing requirements associated 
with re-entry survivability.  Typical CubeSat missions 
selected for ISS deployment have a less rigorous review 
process that may not evaluate aspects beyond overall 
design feasibility.  CubeSat design teams often do not 
have the resources to ensure their design is compliant 
with re-entry risk requirements.   
A study was conducted to examine methods to easily 
identify the maximum amount of a given material that 
can be used in the construction of a CubeSats without 
posing harm to persons on the ground.  The results 
demonstrate that there is not a general equation or 
relationship that can be used for all materials; instead a 
limiting value must be defined for each unique material.  
In addition, the specific limits found for a number of 
generic materials that have been previously used as 
benchmarking materials for re-entry survivability 
analysis tool comparison will be discussed. 
 
 
1. Definition of a CubeSat 
The CubeSat design specification was developed and is 
maintained by California Polytechnic San Luis Obispo, 
California in [1].  CubeSat dimensions are typically 
referenced as 1U, 2U, 3U, etc., referring to CubeSat 
units, where 1U has dimensions of 10 cm x 10 cm x 10 
cm and a mass of approximately 1.33 kg.  The small 
size and mass of these vehicles permits them to be 
added as secondary and tertiary payloads on numerous 
launch vehicles.  Both the Orbital Cygnus and SpaceX 
Dragon vehicles used for resupply of the International 
Space Station (ISS) have included CubeSat deployer 
mechanisms and the ISS currently has a deployer 
installed allowing for the release of CubeSats.  The 
large number of available launch opportunities has 
resulted in a low cost method for university and small 
commercial satellites to get into space.  In addition 
NASA funds a number of opportunities through its 
Launch Services Program Educational Launch of 
Nanosatellites (ELaNa) program.   
 
There are currently no special exemptions or 
permissions for CubeSats in the NASA or U.S. 
Government Debris mitigation guidelines.  For many 
missions, however, the CubeSats are often in the later 
stages of their design cycle before they are offered a 
flight opportunity.  Unfortunately projects often have 
not evaluated their vehicles for orbital debris (OD) 
mitigation guideline compliance prior to being provided 
a flight opportunity.  The result is that any compliance 
issues could significantly impact vehicles that vehicles 
ability to fly as it may be too late in the design process 
to make any necessary changes to ensure compliance.   
 
2. Re-entry Requirements and Analysis 
NASA requirements for OD mitigation can be found in 
[2], the NASA Standard (NS) 8719.14.  Of particular 
interest to this study is requirement 4.7-1 in [2] which 
limits the risk to the population of 1:10,000 from 
impacting debris.  An object is considered to be a 
hazard if it impact with more than 15 J kinetic energy 
(KE). The policy requires the use of either the NASA 
Debris Assessment Software (DAS) or the higher 
fidelity NASA Object Re-entry Survivability Analysis 
Tool (ORSAT) described in [3].   
 
ORSAT includes 78 built in materials that can be used 
to model spacecraft components to determine re-entry 
survivability.  Included in this list are three generic 
materials that are typically used for comparison with 
other re-entry tools; Aluminum, Stainless Steel, and 
Titanium.   
 
3. Analysis Assumptions 
This analysis was initially prompted by questions 
regarding CubeSats being launched from the ISS.  This 
led to the analysis being performed assuming a random 
re-entry from 51.6° inclination with an initial velocity of 
7.5 km/s at 122 km.  The CubeSats were modeled from 
122 to 78 km assuming no heating, with an initial 
temperature of 300 K.   
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20140016958 2019-08-31T16:15:07+00:00Z
  
The heat experienced by an object entering the 
atmosphere is strongly dependent on the size of the 
object and its velocity.  The velocity is a function of its 
ballistic coefficient, which is a function of size and 
mass.  The impact was a requirement that a varied set of 
initial conditions be applied.  Specifically the analysis 
evaluated the re-entry survivability of components 1U, 
2U, 3U, 6U, and 12U satellites with mass and 
dimensions as defined in Table 1. 
 
Form 
Factor 
X Dim 
(cm) 
Y Dim 
(cm) 
Z Dim 
(cm) 
Mass  
(kg)
1U 10 10 10 1.33 
2U 20 10 10 2.66 
3U 30 10 10 4.00 
6U 30 20 10 8.00 
12U 30 20 20 12.00 
Table 1. CubeSat form factor dimension and mass 
definitions 
 
The components inside the CubeSats were modeled as 
either spheres, cylinders, or boxes, all randomly 
tumbling once they are released form the parent at 78 
km.  For this analysis no objects were considered to be 
nested inside of other objects beyond the parent 
CubeSat.   
 
The dimensions of these components varied from 1 cm 
x 1cm up to the maximum which would fit inside the 
parent being modeled.  The maximum sphere size was a 
10 cm diameter, while cylinders had maximum 
dimensions of 10 cm x 30 cm, and boxes a maximum of 
30 cm x 20 cm x 20 cm.  The mass was varied with the 
minimum being the smallest mass that would result in a 
wall thickness of at least 1mm.  The maximum mass 
was limited to 1.25 times the number of CubeSat units 
(i.e. for a 1 U CubeSat the maximum mass of an object 
was 1.25 kg).   
 
4. Results  
In total more than 14,000 components were modeled.  
Figure 1 shows a demise altitude versus downrange 
distance plot for all of the components, which has been 
normalized for by setting the 78 km break-up altitude as 
0 km downrange.  It is clear that many of the objects 
survive and the objects originate from all five sizes of 
CubeSat. 
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Figure 1.  Demise Altitude (km) versus Downrange 
Distance (km) of all components.   
 
Initially it was hypothesized that there may be a 
relationship between the melting temperature of a 
material and the maximum amount of mass of that 
material that can be used without being hazardous.  As 
illustrated in figure 2, the relationship was not simple.  
There are a number of materials with lower melting 
temperatures which have relatively low limits on the 
mass that can be used.  Conversely there are a number 
of materials with higher melting temperatures that 
demised even with the maximum allowable mass of 
material.   
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Figure 2. Melting Ttemperature (K) versus Maximum 
Safe Mass (kg) 
 
With mass being a driving factor in determining the 
survivability of an object, the next hypothesis centered 
on the density.  The result for the comparison was much 
the same as melting temperature.  Some of the highest 
density materials tended to always demise, and a 
number of the lower density materials would survive in 
nearly all cases.   
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Figure 3. Denisty (kg/m3) versus Maximum Safe Mass 
(kg) 
 
The final variable to explore was the specific heat of 
ablation for the object.  The specific heat of ablation is 
the amount of heat required to result in an objects 
demise divided by its mass and is calculated as in Eq. 1.   
. 
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Where Cp is the material specific heat capacity, hf is the 
material heat of formation, Ti is the initial temperature 
(300 K in this analysis), and Tmelt is the material melt 
temperature.  Figure 4 shows a comparison between the 
heat of ablation and the maximum safe mass.  For a 
specific heat of ablation below about 950 kJ, 
components pose no risk to people on the ground as any 
object impacting the ground does so with a KE < 15 J.   
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Figure 4. Specific Heat of Ablation (kJ) versus 
Maximum Safe Mass (kg) 
 
The data in table 2 represents the results for generic 
aluminum, stainless steel, and aluminum.  Comparing 
the specific heat of ablation with the maximum safe 
mass it can be seen that for a material illustrates that for 
a material with a specific heat of ablation less than 950 
kJ the limit of allowable mass is as high as the limit of 
analyzed mass.  As the specific heat of ablation 
increases the allowable mass decreases.   
 
Material 
Melt 
Temp 
(K) 
Max 
Safe 
Mass 
(kg) 
Cp      
(J/kg‐
K) 
hf        
(J/kg) 
Spec. Heat 
of Ablation 
(kJ) 
Al  850  11.2  1100  390000  934.5 
SS  1700  9.4  600  270000  1026 
Ti  1950  1.8  600  470000  1361 
Table 2. Results for generic materials used 
 
5. Conclusions 
There is no simple equation that will define how much 
mass of a given material can be used in the construction 
of a CubeSat.  For ISS deployed object it is possible to 
eliminate the need for analysis for components whose 
specific heat of ablation is below 950 kJ.  For those 
objects with a higher specific heat of ablation further 
analysis is required on those objects before a 
determination can be made regarding the risk to the 
public from reentering CubeSat components. 
 
6. Recommendations 
This analysis was limited to objects deployed from the 
ISS.  It is recommended that further analysis be 
conducted to determine if the 950 kJ limit is constant 
across multiple inclinations, or of the orbital velocity 
variance changes the limit on the specific heat of 
ablation.   
 
9.    REFERENCES 
 
1.  Mehrparvar, A., Pignatelli, D., Carnahan, J., 
Munakat, R., Lan, W., Toorian, A., 
Hutputanasin, A., & Lee, S. (2014). CubeSat 
Design Specification Rev 13, The CubeSat 
Program, Cal Poly San Luis Obispo, US  
 
2.  National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration.NASA-STD-8719.14A Process 
for Limiting Orbital Debris Available at: 
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/doctree/8
71914.pdf,  Accessed: 10/1/2014 
 
3.  Dobarco-Otero, J., Smith, R. N., Bledsoe, K. J., 
De Laune R. M. (2006).  JSC-62861, User’s 
Guide for Object Reentry Survival Analysis 
Tool (ORSAT) – Version 6.0, Vol. I. 
